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Abstract 
 
It is commonly argued that a serious right to life is grounded only in actual, relatively                
advanced psychological capacities a being has acquired. The moral permissibility of           
abortion is frequently argued for on these grounds. Increasingly it is being argued             
that such accounts also entail the permissibility of infanticide, with several           
proponents of these theories accepting this consequence. We show, however, that           
these accounts imply the permissibility of even more unpalatable acts than           
infanticide performed on infants: organ harvesting, live experimentation, sexual         
interference, and discriminatory killing. The stronger intuitions against the         
permissibility of these ‘pre-personal acts’ allow us to re-establish a comprehensive           




Advocates of the moral permissibility of abortion often base their views on a             
conception of rights or interests which apply only to a specific subset of human              
 beings – usually termed ‘persons’ – where one is a person only if one satisfies               
certain psychological, cognitive, or other requirements. Although this is not the only            
way of generating the conclusion that abortion is permissible – others appeal to             
maternal bodily autonomy or similar considerations independent of the value or           
rights of the foetus – it is one of the more common and persuasive. Since foetuses                1
lack the relevant psychological apparatus or features (either in kind or degree), they             
lack certain rights or interests that adult humans ordinarily have, including the right to              
life. It is often held, by extension, that these considerations likewise justify early             2
infanticide in some or all circumstances, since there is no relevant disparity between             
the capacities or abilities of, for example, late-stage foetuses and infants. On this             
account, therefore, infants also lack the serious right to life which we typically             
predicate of adult humans. 
 
The conclusion that infanticide is permissible was once widely considered a           
convincing ​reductio ad absurdum of psychological accounts of persons, rights or           
interests. , Given the growing acceptance of the permissibility of infanticide, whether           3 4
1 We note that several of our interlocutors here have objected to the autonomy-based arguments for                
the permissibility of abortion. 
2 We do not hereby imply that a ‘right to life’ is indefeasible – only that the extent to which a human life                       
is morally or legally protected, according to the authors in question, is a function of these                
psychological capacities. For those undisposed towards ‘rights’, our argument can be adapted,            
mutatis mutandis​, for various accounts of the wrongness of murder. 
3 It is possible that a psychological account of rights is true while a psychological account of                 
personhood is false – if personhood and rights come apart, for example. For ease of discussion,                
however, we stipulate that ‘person’ means something like ‘bearer of the serious rights we normally               
accord to adult humans’. So we leave open the possibility of, for example, entirely unconscious beings                
being ‘persons’, laying aside the Lockean tradition of taking ‘person’ to verbally imply certain              
conscious traits. When we refer to ‘psychological accounts’, therefore, we are referring to both              
psychological accounts of personhood and psychological accounts of value and rights, since            
‘personhood’ in our essay just is the status of having those rights. 
4 e.g. Sumner 1981. 
 for severely disabled infants or more broadly, this has gradually ceased to be the              5
case. But if infanticide is no longer too big a bullet to bite, there remain bigger ones.                 
It is therefore worth exploring other implications of psychological accounts, many of            
which receive no such analogical support . In doing so, we attempt to re-establish a              6
persuasive ​reductio​. Given psychological accounts, we argue, it follows, first, that           
infanticide is permissible for healthy infants. Secondly, infants can be harvested for            
organ transplants (or, perhaps, for more trivial reasons). Thirdly, infants can be            
subject to live, invasive experimentation. Fourthly, infants can be used for sexual            
gratification. Finally, infants can be actively discriminated against on the basis of            
what are generally accepted protected characteristics for mature humans. 
Psychology and personhood 
 
Let us consider more closely how and which psychological capacities are supposed            
to generate a serious right to life. According to defenders of psychological accounts,             
psychological capacities and abilities are thought to confer moral value, often by            
generating intermediary ethical currency which may depend on such capacities -           
desires and interests, for example. In a variety of ways, these impose normative             
obligations upon others within the community of persons - what McMahan (2003)            
calls the ‘morality of respect’. One such obligation has been characterised as the             
‘right to life’. For clarity, we take ‘x has a right to life’ to mean that other humans                  
ordinarily have an obligation to refrain from killing x (excepting perhaps cases of             
5 Some contemporary examples of arguments in support of some form of infanticide include: Räsänen               
2016; Schuklenk 2015; McMahan 2013; Hassoun and Kriegel 2008. 
6 As, for example, the palatability of infanticide has been strengthened by its link with euthanasia in 
cases of severe disability. 
 self-defence, and so on).  7
 
Philosophers have therefore frequently sought to establish those properties of          
objects or agents which constitute or indicate personhood, or which otherwise           
establish a right to life. We do not seek to delineate the precise relationship between               
psychological capacities and rights here, nor do we hasten to establish a            
comprehensive account of these rights and their theoretical underpinnings. Rather,          
we will briefly outline the theoretical background of the main defences of infanticide,             
before arguing that the same accounts which permit infanticide fail equally to prohibit             
considerably more unpalatable actions. 
 
Such accounts normally include reference to certain conscious capacities. Tooley’s          8
initial work, for example, suggested the following account: ‘An organism possesses a            
serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of                  
experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing              
entity’ (1972, p. 44). Since rights are based on desires, and desires of necessity              
require conceptual (though not necessarily linguistic) understanding of the desired          
state of affairs, the desire to continue existing requires the concept of a continuing              
self, and so beings lacking such a concept cannot have the desire (and hence nor               
the right) to live. 
 
7 It is plausible that this right entails not only negative duties as mentioned here but also positive                  
duties: so, for example, many think it plausible that societies have an obligation to protect and                
preserve life through healthcare, etc. 
8 David Boonin (2003) requires ‘organized cortical brain activity’, which is detectable by the 25th week                
of gestation, for the right to life. As this is not strictly a psychological account, we will not discuss his                    
views further here. 
 Along similar lines, Joel Feinberg (1974) argues that to have rights, an entity must              
have ​interests​, which are composed in some way of conations such as wishes,             
desires and hopes. Although he ultimately concludes that infanticide is normally           
wrong for pragmatic reasons, he indicates that it is not intrinsically wrong in virtue of               
killing a person. Tooley (1988, p. 87) later adopted the notion of interests in a slight                
modification of his view: ‘a thing’s interest is a function of its present and future               
desires’. Foetuses and newborns are not included, however, because there ​is no            
person who persists from infancy to adulthood, and so they do not have future              
desires. And so the conclusion remains broadly the same. 
 
One widely suggested psychological criterion is self-awareness. Self-awareness in         
young children has historically been measured by the mirror self-recognition (MSR)           
test (Rochat and Zahavi 2011). However, children do not commonly pass the MSR             
test until between 18-24 months of age (Broesch ​et al ​. 2011) and the exact meaning               
of the test is still disputed . Furthermore some psychologists have presented various            9
stages of self-awareness that do not culminate in children until 5-years of age             
(Rochat 2003); under some psychological accounts this would significantly increase          
the threshold for possessing a right to life. In addition, children do not perceive              
themselves as an enduring self across both time and space until they are 3-4 years               
of age (Rochat 2003); this has serious implications for psychological accounts of            
persons which rely on a particular kind of self-awareness. Given the length of time it               
takes for self-awareness to unfold in children, Giubilini and Minerva’s (2013) case for             
9 One reason for this is the significant cross-cultural variation that has been demonstrated in the MSR                 
test pass rates, which may undermine its use as a reliable universal measure of self-awareness. In                
one cross-cultural study looking at 18- to 20-month-olds, over 50% of German, Greek and Costa               
Rican children passed the MSR test, compared with 4% of Cameroonian children.  
 neonaticide or ‘post-birth abortion’ is actually very conservative. Of course, other           
psychological criteria will not be so restrictive - we note here only accounts need to               
be very carefully drawn even to include young children in the morality of respect. 
 
Kuhse and Singer (1985, p. 120) cite Joseph Fletcher’s requirements of           
‘self-awareness, self-control, a sense of the future, a sense of the past, the capacity              
to relate to others, concern for others, communication, and curiosity’, while Singer            
(2011) elsewhere refers to the simple Lockean themes of rationality and           
self-consciousness. Mary Anne Warren’s (1973) classic article outlines five criteria,          
including ‘the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness’. More recently,         
Giubilini and Minerva (2013, p. 262) state that a person is an ‘individual who is               
capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that              
being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her’. It is unclear exactly what               
this means or how it could be measured, but it seems to require the capacity for                
self-awareness. Elsewhere, they suggest that infants can be harmed by killing           
insofar as they have ‘aims’. Again, how rudimentary these may be (or in fact are) is                
not specified. 
 
Finally, McMahan (2003) makes explicit a two-tiered account in which only beings            10
with psychological capacities or properties above a certain threshold are granted full            
moral status and are subject to the ‘morality of respect’. According to this account,              
the killing of any such being is equally wrong, ​ceteris paribus ​. McMahan’s account of              
10This is implicit in other accounts too, e.g. where authors say that infants have no right to life but still                    
have a right not to have pain inflicted on them. But McMahan’s is seemingly distinctive in that he                  
appears to attribute some ​value to the infant’s life, rather than just granting it the right not to have pain                    
inflicted. 
 this threshold makes no detailed claim about where the threshold lies: we do not              
know what constitutes the threshold, he suggests, but given that animals fall below it,              
and given that it is based on psychological capacities, foetuses and infants must also              
fall below it.  
 
Below this threshold of respect, killing is not as serious as the killing of an adult                
person, as the object/agent does not have equal moral status. Although killing is still              
a harm, it is not a harm that applies equally: rather, it is governed by McMahan’s                
time-relative interest account (TRIA), where S’s interests are a function of the good             
contained within S’s future if S does not die, and the strength of the psychological               
connections between S and S’s future self. 
 
Pre-personal humans and pre-personal acts 
 
According to these accounts, not all human beings are persons. There is a threshold              
(usually taken to be a complex of psychological properties and capacities) that must             
be attained for a human to be regarded as a person and to gain the rights most adult                  
humans have. Although foetuses, newborns and infants may have some rights in            
virtue of their limited psychological capacities, they come nowhere near to having a             
serious right to life. And, in particular, the rights they do have are typically              
overridable by the rights or interests of actual persons. 
 
Warren (1973), for example, allows that a ​potential person may still possess ​some             
right to life, but states that this can never outweigh the rights of an ​actual person, in                 
 particular the mother, who has a right to protect her ‘health, happiness, freedom and              
even her life’. That is, a person’s rights should always outweigh the rights of a               
non-person. Similarly, Giubilini and Minerva (2013, p. 263) state that ‘the interests of             
actual people over-ride the interest of merely potential people to become actual            
ones’. They do note that non-persons have a right not to have unnecessary pain              
inflicted upon them, just as it is generally accepted amongst utilitarians that pain             
should not be gratuitously inflicted on any sentient creature. 
 
Let us call human beings who have not yet met the criteria for personhood              
pre-personal humans ​. More precisely for our purposes, a pre-personal human is any            
human who has not yet attained the capacities or other features sufficient for             
inclusion within the community of full rights-bearers. We also define ​pre-personal           
acts ​: acts performed on or with a pre-personal human. It is to these we now turn. 
1. The permissibility of infanticide 
 
The first implication normally drawn from psychological criteria for personhood is the            
relative permissibility of abortion at any stage of pregnancy. Foetuses, even at the             
later stages of pregnancy, are not (according to some accounts) self-aware or            
rational, and lack the concept of a continuing self, even though they may be              
minimally conscious (Lagercrantz and Changeux 2009); they are, therefore, not          
persons. Consequently, they do not have a right to life. 
 
 It is important to note that under McMahan’s TRIA, a foetus that is conscious does               
have an interest in living, albeit a weak interest because of its minimal psychological              
continuity with its future self, despite significant possible good in its future. But it              
does have an interest, which is why McMahan considers late-term abortions morally            
different to early-term abortions. However, its weak time-relative interests cannot          
prevail against the much stronger time-relative interests of existing persons such as            
parents, and since it has no right to life, McMahan regards late-term abortions as still               
permissible. 
 
Infants are little different to conscious foetuses psychologically, and so according to            
typical psychological accounts of personhood, value and rights, they also lack a right             
to life. Again, their weak psychological continuity with their future selves means they             
have a similarly weak time-relative interest in living. The natural implication is that             
infanticide is at least sometimes permissible, and typically, ethicists who hold to            
psychological accounts agree that this is true for cases of severely disabled infants             
whose quality of life is likely to be poor. 
 
As several defenders of infanticide point out, however, these considerations actually           
imply the permissibility of infanticide in a much wider variety of cases – most of the                
aforementioned authors do not make room in their accounts for any rights for             
foetuses and infants (excepting perhaps the right not to be subject to pain), while the               
other accounts suggest that in view of their minimal psychological capacities, their            
rights are present but easily overridable and, in McMahan’s (2003, p. 339) words,             
‘may permissibly be weighed and traded off against the time-relative interests of            
 others in the manner approved by consequentialists’. If this is correct, of course, it is               
plausible that infanticide is sometimes ​obligatory​. 
 
While some defenders of infanticide have focused on cases of severe disability,            
therefore, this focus has only pragmatic grounding. If the rights of infants are             
overridable by the rights of actual persons, there is no reason why healthy infants              
should be immune from the utilitarian calculus: if the interests of adults can be              
furthered sufficiently by killing the infant, there is no theoretical ground for opposing             
such killing. And even those who offer pragmatic reasons for limiting infanticide do             
not deny that there could be fairly simple goods outweighing these practical            
considerations. 
 
Ethicists are increasingly advocating more liberal approaches to infanticide.         
McMahan acknowledges the problem, concluding that his views entail that orphaned           
infants could be (and, perhaps, ​ought to be) ​utilised for organ transplants to save              
other children. According to McMahan (2003, p. 360), ‘most people will find this             
implication intolerable’, and he freely confesses ‘that I cannot embrace it without            
significant misgivings and considerable unease’. Despite his unease, however,         
McMahan (2003, p. 361) feels he is inexorably forced into accepting that newborns             
must be ‘in principle, sacrificable’. 
 
Giubilini and Minerva (2013, p. 262), likewise, have recently referred to infanticide as             
after-birth abortion to emphasise their view that it is morally equivalent to abortion:             
‘we claim that killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the             
 circumstances where abortion would be’. Giubilini and Minerva suggest that this           
might be the case for at least a few weeks after birth. While they give no detailed                 
exposition of when abortion is acceptable, it includes circumstances where the infant            
will have an (at least) acceptable life, but the well-being of the family is at risk. One                 
suspects, of course, that for many people the circumstances in which abortion is             
thought to be acceptable are considerably wider. 
 
It seems clear that despite the intention on the part of some to limit infanticide to                
severely disabled infants, other ethicists are not so reticent to embrace the            
consequences of these psychological accounts in endorsing the killing of healthy           
infants. For those who hold to a form of consequentialism (and for those who hold to                
consequentialism below the ‘threshold of respect’), it is not difficult to find reasons             
why existing persons will benefit from ending the life of healthy infants. If parents              
decide that their child is not wanted after birth due to financial and emotional              
constraints, this may be regarded as sufficient reason. 
 
The implication that infanticide of healthy infants is permissible in certain scenarios            
under psychological accounts is for many, perhaps most, a conclusion to be avoided.             
But while some have been happy to bite the bullet on infanticide, there remain other,               
less widely discussed implications of these accounts. Our moral sensibilities may           
have been chastened by the increasing acceptance of the permissibility of           
infanticide. But, we suggest, they are likely to remain sensitive to more unpalatable             
pre-personal acts, which we now consider. 
 2. Pre-personal use of infant's organs for actual human persons 
 
Involuntary organ donation is one possibility, mentioned by Kaczor (2014) as an            
implication of McMahan’s views. There is a critical shortage of organ donors            
worldwide, and if pre-personal humans that are unwanted by parents or relatives            
could help meet this need, there may be a moral obligation to use them thus. In the                 
UK alone there are approximately 6,500 people waiting on the national transplant            
waiting list, 400 of whom die every year before they never receive an organ donation               
(O’Carroll ​et al​. 2017). 
 
Indeed, we’ve noted that McMahan (2003) concludes it is morally permissible (and            
perhaps obligatory) for orphaned newborns to be used for organ transplants.           
Elsewhere (2007), he states that they ‘fall outside the scope of the constraint against              
harmful using’. And while he does not comment explicitly on non-orphaned           
newborns, it seems that his view should hold for all newborns. If parents have              
decided that their newborn is unwanted (for example, because it is disabled in some              
way, or they have financial constraints, or perhaps even much more trivial reasons)             
and the rights of the child are dependent only on their overridable, weak time-relative              
interests, it is a short step to thinking that their organs could be used for the benefit                 
of existing persons rather than be discarded. Knowing that their child is preserving             
the life of another child who is likely to have a better quality of life could be of                  
considerable comfort to parents in this situation. Moreover, it is difficult to see how              
there could be any strong argument against even the commercialisation of this            
 practice. And of course, they could even use their child’s organs to prolong their own               
life or that of the child’s sibling. Given their connection to the child, this is an even                 
stronger case than for providing organs to anonymous recipients. While Singer           
argues strongly against organ ​harvesting from infants, citing the attitude of care and             
protection of infants that he considers rules out the practice , it will seem to many               11
people that this does not generate the principled restriction on organ harvesting            
which sits more comfortably with their intuitions. In any case, if that requirement ​were              
very stringent, it is not clear why infanticide of disabled infants – or abortion itself –                
would be permissible, since these also very plausibly run counter to our basic             
attitude of care and protection towards infants. 
 
If psychological accounts are correct and infants are not persons, there may even be              
a moral obligation to utilise available organs to maximise benefit to existing persons.             
Non-consensual organ harvesting, while desirable because of the obvious benefits to           
those in need of organs, is constrained by our obligation to respect surviving             
interests of the dead such as the previously expressed desire for bodily integrity after              
death. There are no such surviving interests for infants - their weak time-relative             
interests cannot survive their death. Discarding their organs appears to be           
unjustifiable, given the great goods that would accrue to actual persons from their             
use.  12
11 Singer and Wells think that this attitude is important ‘for the sake of the welfare of all our children’                    
(1984, p. 149). But if he thinks we should all accept his arguments that infants and children are                  
fundamentally different entities with different rights then, were we to do so, having an opportunistic               
attitude towards infants would be entirely consonant with having a protective attitude towards more              
mature children. In that case, there would be no obstacle to organ harvesting from infants. 
12 It is at least worth considering whether more trivial benefits for actual persons might equally justify 
this practice. After all, if the deontic constraints on killing humans are absent for infants, and if they 
are sufficiently anaesthetised (for example), it becomes difficult to explain why only the great benefit 
  
It may also be permissible for infants to be deliberately conceived or created to              
alleviate the shortage of human organs. Hypothetically, it may eventually be feasible            
to prevent brain development and thus the development of self-awareness. We could            
keep infants permanently unconscious, so that they never have the opportunity to            
become persons, a scenario suggested by Peter Singer and Deanne Wells (1984).            
Similarly, Carol Kahn has suggested ‘body clones’ - brainless bodies cultivated for            
rejection-free body parts (Kahn 1989), as has McMahan (2003). These          
‘baby-farming’ scenarios would allow the development of more mature organs over a            
period of months or even years. 
 
3. Pre-personal use of infants for medical research 
 
There are similar pre-personal acts which could benefit actual persons. Foetal tissue            
from aborted foetuses has for many years been used in medical research, in areas              
as diverse as HIV/AIDS, developmental biology, eye development and diseases,          
infectious diseases, vaccines, and transplantation. According to bioethicist R. Alta          
Charo (2015), nearly everyone in the United States (US) has benefited in some             
respect from research using foetal tissue. But with similar justification, tissue           
obtained from infants whose lives have been ended by infanticide could also be             
used. 
 
of saving lives via organ transplants would justify the practice - why not more trivial benefits, like 
purely hedonic ones? 
 The use of euthanised infants’ organs and tissues in this way is not the only               
possibility. Of necessity, much medical research is conducted on living beings,           
including human beings who volunteer themselves and animals who do not           
volunteer. If infanticide is permissible (which, we recall, follows relatively naturally           
from these psychological accounts of rights), it seems that using infants for medical             
research prior to being euthanised (or even without being euthanised) would also be             
permissible, provided sufficient benefits to actual persons accrue. It would be           
necessary to ensure that the research does not cause pain, but this is compatible              
with relatively extreme actions as long as appropriate safeguards are in place (e.g. a              
requirement for sufficient analgesia). It might even be that a degree (perhaps a large              
degree) of pain is morally acceptable, provided it is not gratuitous, and provided the              
benefits are sufficiently large. It is also possible that this could be a commercial              
transaction. 
 
Peter Singer notes this possibility when addressing animal experimentation. As a           
utilitarian, he acknowledges that if the benefits (for animals or humans) are            
substantial and could be obtained by sufficiently small suffering to animals, animal            
experimentation may be morally acceptable. He challenges those in favour of doing            
so to likewise be willing to experiment on ‘orphaned humans with severe and             
irreversible brain damage’ (Singer, 2011, p. 57), given their very limited cognitive            
capacities. But it is a small step to suggest experimenting on infants with similar              
cognitive limitations, given the massive potential benefits for actual persons. The           
implication that infants could permissibly be used for live invasive experimentation           
will be a deeply uncomfortable one for many people. 
  
4. Pre-personal use of infants for sexual gratification 
 
One of the most unpalatable pre-personal acts is the use of pre-personal humans for              
sexual gratification. Provided that such acts do not result in physical damage or pain,              
such acts could be permitted on any human that is yet to reach the threshold of                
personhood, including those that will become persons in the future. Given their very             
weak psychological connection to that future person, in this scenario it seems that             
little to no harm has been done to any person. Of course, if the infant is subsequently                 
killed, harm that would manifest in the future may not even be relevant.             
Consequently, the hedonic benefit to existing persons does not need to be            
overwhelmingly great to override the interests of the pre-personal human. In any            
case, since there is no principled objection to using infants in this way according to               
the morality of respect, all that is necessary to justify it is sufficient gratification for               
the actor. Effectively, this could legitimise sexual abuse of very young children,            
whether it be parents abusing their own children, or other persons doing so with the               
parents’ consent. ​Again, as with organ harvesting and experimentation, this could           
even be commercialised. 
 
We can get a tighter grip on this by considering non-consensual sex with animals.              
Although for most of us bestiality elicits revulsion, many find it difficult to explain why               
it is morally wrong provided the animal is not harmed. Of course, animals cannot              
give informed consent, but there are circumstances where animals seem to           
participate willingly. Peter Singer, for example, has concluded that it is ‘not wrong             
 inherently in a moral sense’ (Olasky, 2004), even if the animal qualifies as a person               
according to his psychological criteria. If ​we are to ground the common intuition that              
having sexual relations with infants is wrong, we will need an explanation of why              
infants have a non-negotiable right to sexual integrity but animals do not, without             
relying on species exceptionalism . 13
 
On the psychological accounts of rights in question, it is difficult to give such an               
explanation. While we do not have the space to exhaust possible explanations here,             
we can use two recent accounts of the wrongness of rape to illustrate the difficulty               
here. Archard’s (2007) careful account follows Feinberg initially in taking ‘harm’ to            
mean a ‘setback to another’s interests’. We can see already that those accounts             
which deny the foetus interests (in virtue of not being a continuing self) or which give                
the foetus at best weak, overridable interests are going to have difficulty locating the              
particular heinousness of rape of infants in the harm it causes to the infant. 
 
On Archard’s account, rape is wrong since sexual integrity is a central concern or              
interest of a person and of one’s identity - ‘our sexuality is an interest which defines                
who and what each of us is’. He continues, ‘The more central interests are to               
personhood, the greater the harm, and hence moral injury, done to someone in             
overriding her consent in relation to the interests. So if sex is central to personhood,               
[non-consensual sex] assaults the very ‘core’ of the self and causes great moral             
injury’ (Archard, 2007, p. 390). 
13 It is possible that one might deny, ​pace ​Singer, the permissibility of bestiality (as the authors do). 
But in that case we will need an explanation for ​both​ the wrongness of bestiality (with animals of 
similar cognitive capacity as infants) and the wrongness of using infants for sexual gratification. 
  
But if infants are not persons in any relevant sense, and if they are not part of the                  
‘morality of respect’ in virtue of being ‘one of us’, it is difficult to see how rape could                  
constitute such an assault on them. And it is especially difficult to see, if infants are                
not ‘one of us’ in a way that accords them broadly the same rights as us, why we                  
should attribute to them the same interest in sexual integrity which we have. For              
those who oppose abortion and infanticide, one way to attribute the same interest             
here is in claiming an identity relation between foetuses, infants and adults, and to              
suggest that identity relations are sufficient (though not necessary) to preserve           
interests and rights. But to posit a relation that preserves interests without            14
preserving rights seems entirely ad hoc. Yet that is the sort of move a defender of                
infanticide must make to defend an infant’s right to sexual integrity in the sort of               
framework Archard suggests.  15
 
Berkich (2009, p. 397) helpfully surveys a broad range of views concerning what             
makes rape so heinous, eventually concluding: ‘I submit that rape is heinous            
because it involves the sexual appropriation of a person, where rape sexually            
appropriates a person in Frankfurt’s sense by contravening an important class of the             
second-order desires which constitute the person’. 
 
14 This is not the only way, of course. 
15 Archard does mention that one need not consider sex to be central to one’s personhood or to be                   
highly sexually motivated for sex to be a central interest of ours. We think this is true, but does not                    
help the psychological theorist generate an account of the wrongness of using infants for sexual               
gratification. 
 ‘The appropriation of a person for personal use’ is taken by Berkich (2009, p. 391) to                
be part of what makes rape so heinous. But he notes that certain kinds of heinous                
act can be more heinous than others. In the case of rape, following Archard, he               
notes that rape is particularly heinous in virtue of its attacking a domain central to               
personhood. But he goes further: drawing on Frankfurt’s work on personhood and            
love, Berkich draws attention to one particularly important feature of persons,           
namely, their capacity for second-order desires. Rape attacks our second-order          
desires in at least two ways. Firstly, it attacks our second-order desires about sex              
itself: so, for example, date-rape still constitutes rape despite the first-order desire for             
sex potentially being present. Secondly, love itself is best characterised as caring for             
the beloved, where caring involves second-order desires, e.g. by setting aside our            
own desires to care for our beloved, or by deliberately shaping our own desires and               
wills in order to desire and will what is best for our beloved: ‘sex between lovers                
reflects the rich and complicated reflective or second-order desires we have           
regarding the affections we have towards ourselves and others’ (2009, p. 395). Since             
rape attacks our personhood so centrally, by attacking our second-order desires in            
such personal and important domains, it ‘reaches through the will to dominate the             
person herself in a way mere assault does not’ (2009, p. 396). 
 
Again, however, it is difficult to see how this account could explain the heinousness              
of sexual relations with infants if a psychological account of rights is granted. For the               
account essentially follows Archard in suggesting that rape violates something          
central to personhood. And the modifications Berkich makes do not help here. If             
infants are not persons, and if they can be dealt with ‘in the manner approved by                
 consequentialists’, it is unclear why they should not be appropriated for personal            
use. And it is not at all plausible that infants are sufficiently attuned to second-order               
desires of love and sex for this to provide separate reason against violating them              
thus. So if infants - like animals - are excluded from the moral community of               16
persons, it becomes difficult to explain why they may not be used opportunistically -              
occasionally even sexually. 
 
Lest this seem uncharitable, we note that this implication is borne out by the recent               
case of Anna Stubblefield, who was convicted of aggravated sexual assault on a             
29-year-old man with severe cerebral palsy and sentenced to 12 years           
imprisonment. While McMahan and Singer (2017) objected primarily to the          17
judgment on empirical grounds, they offer a comment in passing on the sexual rights              
the victim would have if he ​were​, in fact, too cognitively impaired to consent: ‘it               
makes it less clear what the nature of the wrong might be … if Stubblefield wronged                
or harmed him, it must have been in a way that he is incapable of understanding and                 
that affected his experience only pleasurably’. It is similarly unclear what the nature             
of the wrong might be in cases of infants used in analogous circumstances. This is a                
strong mark against psychological theories of value and rights. 
 
There are, of course, good utilitarian reasons why such behaviour with infants should             
be prohibited. It would be difficult to guarantee that infants were not physically             
16 Tooley’s account of desiring x requires conceptual understanding of x, and it is implausible that                
infants have such conceptual understanding. Of course, it might be that they have latent second-order               
desires against being used sexually, but the admission of latent second-order desires would only              
serve to prohibit abortion and infanticide similarly. 
17 The conviction has been overturned on appeal and a retrial has been ordered. 
 harmed, and it may encourage some adults to abuse older children. While these             
reasons might indeed be powerful, and of course, defenders of psychological           
accounts do not, in fact, endorse sexual activity with infants, it is difficult to see how                
this prohibition is implied by their ​theories​. For the problem with such justifications is              
that most people would recoil at the idea that there are only instrumental reasons for               
the prohibition on sexual activity with infants: the heinousness of sexual activity with             
infants is surely something intrinsic to the action itself - not merely a pragmatic              
concern.  
5. Pre-personal discrimination 
Our final example concerns pre-personal discrimination. We ordinarily think it is           
wrong to harm or kill those who are ‘one of us’ – persons, humans, or members of                 
the moral or human community. We think that it is especially wrong to do so on the                 
grounds of that person’s skin colour, sex or sexual orientation (whether or not these              
constitute a separate harm or merely aggravate the initial harm need not detain us              
here). But most of us are agree that such protected characteristics apply only to ​us​,               
and not to pebbles, crocuses or mosquitoes. It is not racist to selectively destroy              
beige pebbles on a beach (because one prefers the other colours aesthetically), and             
it is not sexist to selectively kill female mosquitoes (for example, to help stop the               
spread of malaria). 
 
We suggest that human infants are more similar in kind to human adults than              
pebbles and mosquitoes in this respect. It would be wrong to selectively destroy             
black infants because one prefers white infants aesthetically, just as it would be             
 wrong to selectively destroy female infants for the same reason (or to help prevent              
the spread of Duchenne muscular dystrophy). Or, supposing we could tell from an             
early stage whether a child was likely to be same-sex attracted or not, it would be                
wrong to kill an infant on those grounds (this need not result directly from antipathy               
towards same-sex attracted people: one might have only the resources to raise one             
child, and yet strongly desire grandchildren, in a country where same-sex attracted            
adults were banned from adopting). The killing of infants because of their skin colour,              
sex or sexual orientation, we suggest, would strike most people as heinous – and              
rightly so, we think. 
 
But why? If infants are one of us, and part of our moral and human community, we                 
can rule out such killings on the same grounds. The exact reason racism is wrong               
may be disputed, but many have thought it wrong on the grounds that it is our                
common humanity that grounds our human rights, such that discriminatory treatment           
on the grounds of protected characteristics attacks the human dignity of the victims.             
This sort of account accommodates the intuition against the discriminatory killing of            
infants quite readily. 
 
And yet the psychological accounts do not. For there is no general prohibition on              
discrimination on the grounds of colour or sex, as we saw earlier. Such prohibitions              
apply only among members of the human moral community. But the psychological            
accounts exclude infants and foetuses from the human moral community, making           
them more like pebbles and mosquitoes in this respect. We suggest, therefore, that             
 the intuitive injunction against the discriminatory killing of infants undermines the           
proposed psychological accounts of value and rights. 
 
Again, we note that there is some precedent for this sort of pre-personal             
discrimination. For example, disabled foetuses can be aborted up to birth in the UK,              
while there is otherwise a limit of 24 weeks. Yet discrimination against disabled             
adults is prohibited by law. Similarly, recent cases of apparent sex-selective           
abortions being offered led to UK MPs voting against a clarification in the law              
prohibiting sex-selective abortion. Moreover, when a private prosecution was brought          
against a doctor implicated in such a practice, the case was taken over by the Crown                
Prosecution Service (CPS) who subsequently dropped it as it was deemed to be ‘not              
in the public interest’ (CPS, 2013). So it is not possible to dismiss this as a strawman                 
implication of psychological accounts. 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
We have detailed these five scenarios as a ​reductio ad absurdum of psychological             
accounts of value and rights. They each appeal to a strong moral intuition that killing,               
harming or otherwise violating innocent human beings, including infants, is wrong,           
and that the behaviours described in these scenarios constitute such violations. 
 
Proponents of psychological accounts of personhood often (though not invariably)          
share these intuitions, but argue that other intuitions pertaining to personhood and            
value imply that a serious right to life requires certain actual - not potential -               
 psychological capacities. This entails the permissibility of abortion, but since infants,           
like foetuses, lack the relevant psychological capacities, they also lack a right to life.              
Moreover, given the tenuous psychological continuity between infants and the future           
person they may become (may, because the infant survives only in our fourth             
scenario, and not necessarily so), that person will not be significantly harmed by             
unremembered pre-personal acts on the infant. Consequently, psychological        
accounts ​prima facie imply the permissibility of our five scenarios, contrary to our             
intuitions about their wrongness or heinousness. 
 
Moral theories that violate our strong intuitions need to explain why these violations             
do not undermine their status as moral theories. As McMahan (2013, p. 109)             
comments, ‘one might even wonder what claim a theory might have to be a moral               
theory if it has foundations that are wholly independent of the intuitions that have              
shaped the common features of all recognizably moral codes’. 
 
There are two options for the defender of psychological accounts: to reject these             
intuitions, or to explain why each of these scenarios is morally problematic. In the              
former case, there is not much we can do other than to strengthen the intuitions and                
defend them from undercutting defeaters. We take it that most people will feel the              
force of these intuitions and not give them up lightly. Although there is a strong               
intuition against infanticide which we have strengthened, we have also detailed           
further scenarios against which there are even stronger intuitions, such that the cost             
of giving them up is augmented. Of course, the cost must be weighed against other               
intuitions in favour of psychological accounts. While we do not have the time to              
 respond to those other intuitions here, we note that they are not without controversy.              
But our primary task here is shoring up the intuitions against pre-personal harms and              
exhibiting the cost of rejecting them. 
 
Some ethicists take up the latter challenge: for example, Feinberg discusses           
infanticide as a potential ​reductio of his position on personhood, concluding that            
‘infanticide ​is wrong’ (1986, p. 210) despite infants not being persons. Feinberg            
explains that kindness towards infants has social utility, and that ‘insofar as            
infanticide would tend to weaken that socially valuable response, it is, on utilitarian             
grounds, morally wrong’. 
 
Other ethicists who also allow the permissibility of infanticide in very restricted            
circumstances (e.g. for severely disabled infants) implicitly indicate that the          
implications are problematic. They go to considerable lengths to justify the restriction            
on circumstances and emphasise that they do not think that infanticide is generally             
permissible. For example, Kuhse and Singer (1985) allow infanticide on the basis            
that some infants are unlikely to be able to live a worthwhile life, and they are                
concerned about the impact on families of caring for a severely disabled infant. As              
previously noted, Singer and Wells strongly opposes our organ donation scenario,           
describing it as ‘a prospect that almost everyone will find repellent’ (1984, p. 148). 
 
McMahan (2013) argues that as infants are more psychologically developed than           
foetuses, according to his TRIA they are harmed to a greater extent by being killed.               
Infanticide is also likely to ‘elicit more intense grief and guilt than abortion typically              
 does’, and the burden of caring for unwanted infants can be met by the state in most                 
instances. 
 
Do these sorts of moves succeed? We think it unlikely. We have shown in this paper                
that the implications of these accounts are more radical than their defenders have             
frequently supposed. And this is increasingly recognised by those authors. Hence,           
McMahan reluctantly concludes that infanticide of orphaned babies for organ          
transplants may be permissible (or obligatory). He does not go on to explain why              
babies unwanted by their parents might not also be utilised for the same purpose (or               
more sinister but pleasurable purposes). Tooley (1988) has long supported          
infanticide for a short period of time after birth, with apparently no restrictions. And in               
recent years, we have seen that Giubilini and Minerva have embraced the            
implications of their views, regarding infanticide as permissible for any reason           
abortion is permissible. 
 
Singer and Feinberg are utilitarians, and it seems obvious that sacrificing unwanted            
healthy infants (who are not persons) could benefit many existing persons. Singer’s            
claims about the importance of society’s attitude of care and protection of infants are              
not convincing, especially since this does not seem to be a consideration when it              
comes to abortion, as Oderberg and Laing note (1997). Feinberg is subject to the              
same criticism about the value of kindness towards infants. 
 
So the task is not merely to explain why these scenarios involve moral wrongdoing. It               
is to explain, firstly, why they involve wrongdoing in ways that, for example, abortion              
 does not. Secondly, since the intuitions here are not merely that the scenarios are to               
be avoided but that they involve intrinsic wrongdoing, we need an explanation of             
their ​intrinsic wrongdoing without reference to practical concerns that might easily be            
outweighed. In particular, we need an explanation of their ​heinousness which, as            
Berkich (2009) has credibly shown, requires (at least) reference to essential and            
significant features of an action – features that are not merely coincidentally present             
(e.g. as common consequences), and features which set a minimum bound of            
heinousness for ​every instance of such an act. Explanations appealing only to            
contingent features, or which allow for these actions to be only negligibly wrong             
insofar as other wrong-making characteristics are absent, will not suffice. 
 
In the absence of such accounts, we conclude that our overall ​reductio succeeds.             
That is, psychological accounts of personhood do at present suggest the           
permissibility of infanticide, even for healthy infants. These accounts also imply the            
permissibility of pre-personal acts such as forced organ donation, use of infants for             
medical research, use of infants for sexual gratification, and discrimination against           
infants. It is difficult to see how these implications can be escaped.  
 
We suggest that infanticide and these other pre-personal acts are morally heinous            
and that this judgment is rightly widely shared. Insofar as this is the case, the               
credibility of psychological accounts is thereby diminished in proportion to the           
strength of the intuitions against such acts. And for most people, we suggest, such              
intuitions have considerable force. But if all this is true, it has significant implications              
for abortion ethics. As we noted in the introduction, many contemporary defences of             
 abortion depend on denying foetuses (and often infants) the status of personhood on             
the basis of psychological accounts of rights, value and personhood. If, as we             
suggest, those accounts are made implausible by the ​reductios described above,           
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